Anthony P. Hamann
Anthony P. Hamann
- Geburt:
- 26.09.1909
- Tot:
- 27.03.1977
- Zusätzliche namen:
- A. P. Hamann, Dutch
- Nationalitäten:
- armenier
- Friedhof:
- Geben Sie den Friedhof
Anthony P. Hamann (September 26, 1909 – March 27, 1977), better known as A. P. Hamann or Dutch, was the city manager of San Jose, California, USA, from 1950 to 1969. During his tenure, San Jose grew from a small agriculture-based city of 95,000 residents to a large economically diverse city of almost 500,000.
Early life and education
Hamann attended Bellarmine College Preparatory and was a football player at Santa Clara University. After graduating in 1932, he served as the university's alumni association director before joining the United States Navy during World War II. After the war, Hamann left the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander, to become a division manager for General Motors.
Political career
On March 10, 1950, Hamann was appointed city manager of San Jose by a 4-3 vote of the city council. His first large project was to pass a bond measure to upgrade and expand the city's sewage system, building a new sewage treatment plant near Alviso. At the time, the city's sewage system was insufficient to handle the large amount of waste produced by the local canneries; Hamann's new plant was designed not just for current demand, but allowed for a significant expansion.
Hamann then directed an aggressive growth program for the city. Growing up in Orange County, Hamann felt that the development of that area, consisting of several mid-sized cities without a dominant city in the region, was a failure and worked to ensure that San Jose became the major city of the Santa Clara Valley. Central to this project were "strip annexations"—Hamann and his staff would determine where new tax-generating developments such as shopping centers were likely to be built, and would annex small strips of territory around the property to ensure no other city could claim the property so that San Jose would receive the sales tax revenue produced by property when it was finally developed.
When industries decided to move into or expand in the area, Hamann would ensure they found a willing partner in the city. IBM wanted to move its research staff out of downtown to a dedicated facility to be sited on unincorporated land south of San Jose, but were being blocked by the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Hamann simply had San Jose annex the proposed site and pushed the project's approval through the city council.
In addition to annexing unincorporated territory, Hamann's staff also annexed existing neighborhoods, including Cambrian Park, and one city. When the city of Alviso attempted to annex the new sewage plant to boost tax revenue, Hamann countered by having San Jose annex Alviso. A special city staff, known as Dutch's Panzer Division, executed 1377 annexations during his time in office—previous to Hamann's administration there had been a total of 42.
Later life
In 1969, anti-growth candidates were elected to the city council, and Hamann chose to resign rather than work with a city council opposed to his program. He returned to Santa Clara University as its vice president of development. He was inducted to the SCU sports Hall of Fame. Hamann and his wife Frances died on March 27, 1977 in the Tenerife airport disaster, a collision of two Boeing 747s in the Canary Islands.
Ursache: wikipedia.org
Keine Orte
27.03.1977 | Tenerife airport disaster
The Tenerife airport disaster was a fatal collision between two Boeing 747 passenger aircraft on Sunday, March 27, 1977, on the runway of Los Rodeos Airport (now known as Tenerife North Airport), on the Spanish island of Tenerife, one of the Canary Islands. The crash is the deadliest accident in aviation history with a total of 583 fatalities. A bomb explosion at Gran Canaria Airport, and the threat of a second bomb, caused many aircraft to be diverted to Los Rodeos Airport. Among them were KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 – the two aircraft involved in the accident. At Los Rodeos Airport, air traffic controllers were forced to park many of the airplanes on the taxiway, thereby blocking it. Further complicating the situation, while authorities waited to reopen Gran Canaria, a dense fog developed at Tenerife, greatly reducing visibility. When Gran Canaria reopened, the parked aircraft blocking the taxiway at Tenerife required both of the 747s to taxi on the only runway in order to get in position for takeoff. The fog was so thick that neither aircraft could see the other, nor could the controller in the tower see the runway or the two 747s on it. As the airport did not have ground radar, the only means for the controller to identify the location of each airplane was via voice reports over the radio. As a result of several misunderstandings, the KLM flight attempted to take off while the Pan Am flight was still on the runway. The resulting collision destroyed both aircraft, killing all 248 aboard the KLM flight and 335 of 396 aboard the Pan Am flight. Sixty-one people aboard the Pan Am flight, including the pilots and flight engineer, survived the disaster. As the accident occurred in Spanish territory, that nation was responsible for investigating the accident. Investigators from the Netherlands and the United States also participated. The investigation revealed that the primary cause of the accident was the captain of the KLM flight taking off without clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC). The investigation specified that the captain did not intentionally take off without clearance; rather he fully believed he had clearance to take off due to misunderstandings between his flight crew and ATC. Dutch investigators placed a greater emphasis on this than their American and Spanish counterparts, but ultimately KLM admitted their crew was responsible for the accident, and the airline financially compensated the victims' relatives. The accident had a lasting influence on the industry, particularly in the area of communication. An increased emphasis was placed on using standardized phraseology in ATC communication by both controllers and pilots alike, thereby reducing the chance for misunderstandings. As part of these changes, the word "takeoff" was removed from general usage, and is only spoken by ATC when actually clearing an aircraft to take off. Less experienced flight crew members were encouraged to challenge their captains when they believed something was not correct, and captains were instructed to listen to their crew and evaluate all decisions in light of crew concerns. This concept was later expanded into what is known today as Crew Resource Management. CRM training is now mandatory for all airline pilots.